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The Continuing Validity of State Takeover Statutes-A
Limited Third Generation
Congress passed the Williams Act 1 to protect investors confronted
with a tender offer 2 and to provide both the offeror and target company
with guidelines. 3 States passed laws regulating takeovers to restrict them
or fill perceived gaps and inadequacies in the federal regulations 4 in an
effort to protect resident shareholders and target corporations located
within the state. 5 While states have been regulating securities transactions for over one hundred years through Blue Sky Laws, 6 state takeover
statutes have been the subject of constitutional challenges under the federal commerce 7 and supremacy clauses. 8 The United States Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America 9 and is ready for the first time in five years to examine the constitutionality of state takeover legislation.
This note analyzes the constitutionality of state takeover statutes.
Part I examines the Williams Act and initial attempts by states to regulate
the tender offer process-the first generation takeover statutes. Part II
considers the second generation of state takeover statutes and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in CTS. Part III presents the analysis courts should
apply when ruling on the constitutionality of state takeover legislation.
Part IV suggests how states may continue to regulate the tender offer
process. Under the proper approach, states may play a limited role
1 The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982)). The Williams Act is an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
2 Federal "tender offer" legislation fails to define the term. Courts have formulated their own
definition. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) (the existence of a tender offer is determined by several factors). See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
626 n.1 (1982); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985). For a more encompassing definition, see S-G Securities, Inc., v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass.
1978) (a publicly announced intention to acquire a substantial block of a company's stock with the
purpose of obtaining control and the subsequent rapid acquisition of large blocks of the stock constitutes a tender offer).
3 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). See also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (purpose of Williams Act is to ensure that shareholders confronted
with a tender offer have adequate information regarding qualifications and intention of the bidder).
4 See Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1976).

5 See id.
6 Comment, The Resurrection of State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v.
Hatch, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1985). See State v. Cushing, 137 Me. 112, 15 A.2d 740
(1940). See also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550, 559 (1917) (Court held that the purpose
of Blue Sky Laws is to prevent fraud in the sale and disposition of securities sold or affected in the
state and observed that such laws affect interstate commerce only incidentally because they touch the
securities only after they were in the hands of resident dealers).
7 "Congress shall have the power to... regulate commerce... among the several states...."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8 "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme law of the land; ... anything in the Constitution or law of any state
to the contrary not withstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
9 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
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in concurrently evaluating and enforcing tender offer disclosure
requirements.
I. Federal and Initial State Regulation
The proxy contest 10 is the traditional means of gaining control of a
company. The tender offer became popular in the 1960s as a new means
of gaining control. 1 The tender offer was faster, more efficient, less
costly, and less regulated.' 2 Congress responded in 1968 by passing the
Williams Act. States followed and began enacting provisions which have
become known as the first generation of state takeover legislation.
A.

The Williams Act
Congress passed the Williams Act in response to tender offers which
removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the
reach of existing disclosure requirements of federal securities law.' 3 The
Act strives to protect investors while simultaneously maintaining a neutral balance between third parties and target management.' 4 The provisions regulate tender offers for, open market purchases of, and
repurchases by the issuing corporation of securities which are registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act company). 15 The disclosure requirements are triggered in two circumstances. First, any person who acquires five percent or more of any class
of equity securities of a 34 Act company must file a schedule with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the relevant exchange, and
the issuer of the security within ten days after reaching the five percent
ownership level. 16 Second, the act makes it unlawful for any person to
make a tender offer for more than five percent of the equity securities of
a 34 Act company, unless the offeror at the time of the offer has filed a
schedule with the SEC, including any solicitation materials prepared in
17
connection with the offer.
The disclosure requirements give the public and management business information and ensure that shareholders have enough information
10 Proxy contests typically occur when two or more parties seek shareholder proxies authorizing
the solicitor to cast the shareholder's vote at the corporation's annual or quarterly meeting. Note,
The Tender Offer RegulationBattle Continues: Should States Regulate Only Local Companies? 60 IND. LJ. 721,
721 n.1 (1985).
11 Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133,
1133-34 (1974).
12 See id. at 1134.
13 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
14 This policy of neutrality was reflected in the House Report: "The bill avoids tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bid." H.R. RP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813. See also Piper, 430 U.S. at 2; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113
CONG. REC. 24, 664 (1967) (Senator Williams explained "we have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids.").
15 Any security that trades on a national securities exchange must be registered pursuant to
§ 12(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1982). Section 1 2(g)(1) of the 1934 Act requires registration of any company with over five million dollars in assets and over 500 shareholders of a class of
equity securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1986).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1986).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1986).
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to make an informed decision in a tender offer.' 8 The disclosure must
specify the purchaser or offeror's background, identity, residence and citizenship, as well as the nature of the beneficial ownership.' 9 The information must reveal the sources and the amount of funds used or to be
used to purchase the shares. 2 0 The purchaser or offeror must disclose
the number of shares owned and any rights to acquire additional
shares. 2 1 If the intention is to acquire control, any plans for liquidating
the issuer of the securities, selling its assets, merging it with another
company, or making any other major business or structural changes must
be specified.2 2 Any contract or agreement made concerning the acquisi23
tion or disposition of the firm's securities must be listed and described.
The SEC does not examine the merits of the proposed tender offer, but
merely reviews the adequacy of the disclosures.2 4 The SEC has the authority to order further disclosures to clarify or supplement the revealed
25
information.
The Williams Act protects shareholders from the time pressures as-

sociated with tender offers. Tender offers must remain open for a minimum of twenty business days. 26 The offeror must give the shareholder
the right to withdraw tendered shares within fifteen days after acceptance
of the offer. 27 A shareholder may withdraw tendered shares if the offeror

does not purchase the shares within sixty days from the date of the original tender offer.2 8 In case of an oversubscription, the Act requires the
offeror to purchase the shares tendered on a pro rata basis.2 9 Thus,
shareholders need not rush to tender their shares on a first come, first

serve basis. The Williams Act requires that all tendering shareholders
receive the same purchase price.3 0 If the offering price changes during
the course of the offer, shareholders who tendered early are treated the

same as those who tender after the price change occurs. The Williams
Act also contains a general antifraud provision, 3 1 which courts have in18 See Piper, 430 U.S. at 35.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(a)
20 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(b)
21 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(d)
22 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(c)

(1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item 2) (1986).
(1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item 3) (1986).
(1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item 5) (1986).
(1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item 4) (1986).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(e) (1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item 6) (1986).
24 Note, supra note 10, at 723.
25 Id.
26 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)-1(a) (1986).
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1986).
28 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
29 Id. § 78n(d)(6). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1986). "If the tender offer is for less than all of
the outstanding securities of a class of equity securities and the bidder is not obligated to purchase
all of the securities tendered," the bidder must purchase from each investor in proportion to the
amount of stock that individual shareholder owns. Id
30 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). In 1986 the rules governing the Williams Act were expanded
with the addition of the all-holders requirement and the best price provision which amended regulations §§ 240.13e-4(0(8) and 14d-10(a). The all-holders requirement mandates that third parties
make offers open to all-holders of the class sought. The best price provision provides that the price
paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other
security holder.
31 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-I to -3 (1986).
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known to the ofterpreted to require disclosure of material information
32
feror even if disclosure was not otherwise required.
The Williams Act avoids lengthy delays that might discourage an offeror's chance for success.3 3 The Act's legislative history reveals this policy and thus the Act does not impose burdens on a bidder prior to
announcing an offer (precommencement requirements).3 35 4 The critical
date is the date a bidder first announces a tender offer.
B.

The First Generation of State Takeover Statutes

Initial attempts by state legislatures to regulate tender offers after
the passage of the Williams Act have been labelled the "first generation
takeover statutes."' 36 The ultimate goal of each state was the same-to
create difficulties for tender offerors. 37 Various provisions, such as advance filing and burdensome disclosure requirements, gave directors an
unreasonable advantage to resist a tender offer by giving them time to
implement a defensive tactic and imposing additional costs and delay on
bidders.3 8 Lower courts began striking down state tender offer statutes
on both preemption and commerce clause grounds.3 9 The United States
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of state takeover legislation
for the first time in Edgar v. MITE Corp.40 The Court held the Illinois
Business Takeover Act 4 ' unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
32 See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1973).
33 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1982) (delay is the most potent weapon
incumbent management has in tender offer fights). According to the SEC, delay enables a target
company to: (1) repurchase its own securities; (2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; (3) issue additional shares of stock; (4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should
the tender offer succeed; (5) arrange a defensive merger;, (6) enter into restrictive loan agreements;
and (7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 10, n.8,
MITE, 347 U.S. at 638 n.13.
34 Congress actually rejected a precommencement requirement three times before enacting the
Williams Act in its present form. See I1I CONG. REC. 28, 257-59 (1965) (20-day requirement); S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong, Ist Sess. 4 (1967) (five-day requirement in 1967); Hearingson H.R. 4285, S.
3431 and S. 336 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1970) (30-day requirement).
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1986). See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 182-83 (3d Cir.
1980). The federal policy underlying these requirements is to insure prompt dissemination of all
material information after the first public announcement. The information is necessary because the
announcement will precipitate significant market activity in the securities of the target company thus
confronting public investors with an immediate need to make investment decisions. See id. at 18283.
36 For a complete listing of those statutes, see Comment, Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes:
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017, 1017 n.6 (1983).
37 See generally Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Track, 83
MiCH. L. REv. 433, 438-41 (1984).
38 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
39 See, e.g., Kennecott Corp., 637 F.2d 181 (New Jersey Corporation Takeover Bid Disclosure Law
violates the supremacy clause); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law violates the commerce and supremacy clauses); Dart Indus., Inc., v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware Tender Offers Act violates the commerce and
supremacy clauses).
40 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The case arose out of a hostile tender offer by MITE for all of the
outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Company, a publicly held Illinois corporation. Id.
41 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-12, paras. 137.51-.70 (Supp. 1981) (repealed 1983).
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The Illinois Act was a typical first generation state takeover statute.
The Act, like other first generation statutes, had three main features.
First, a precommencement notification provision required an offeror to
notify the secretary of state twenty days before the offer became effective.
During that time the statute precluded the offeror from giving shareholders information about the impending offer, but allowed target management to disseminate its own information to shareholders concerning the
offer. 4 2 Second, a hearing provision authorized the secretary of state to
call a hearing at any time during the twenty-day waiting period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he believed it was necessary to
protect the shareholders of the target company. 43 The statute mandated
a hearing if requested by a majority of the target company's outside directors or by Illinois stockholders owning ten percent of the class of securities subject to the offer.4 4 Third, a disclosure and fairness test
provided that if the secretary did not hold a hearing, the secretary must
deny registration where he found the offeror defrauded the offerees or
failed to provide full and fair disclosure to them of all material informa45
tion concerning the offer.
Five justices, with Justice White writing for the majority, held that
the statute placed an unconstitutional indirect burden on interstate commerce. 4 6 Justice White first noted that "not every exercise of state power
with some impact on interstate commerce is invalid." 47 Justice White
stated that under the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church,4 8 a state statute must be upheld if it "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental . . .unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
The Court held that under the Pike test the local interest of shareholder protection asserted by the secretary of state did not outweigh the
42

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-12, para. 137.54 A (Supp. 1981) (repealed 1983).

43

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-12, para. 137.57 A (Supp. 1981) (repealed 1983).

44 Id.
45 IL.. REV. STAT. ch. 121-12, para. 137.57 E (Supp. 1981) (repealed 1983).
46 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in Justice White's
opinion concerning the unconstitutionality of the Illinois statute as an indirect burden on interstate
commerce. 457 U.S. at 626. Only ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined
Justice White in holding that the Act directly burdened interstate commerce. Id. Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Rehnquist found that the Court lacked jurisdiction. Id. Only ChiefJustice Burger and
Justice Blackman joined Justice White in holding that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act.
Justice White stated that the Illinois Act upset the balance between management and the bidder
struck by Congress and thus was as obstacle to the accomplishment and full purposes and objectives
of Congress. First, the twenty-day precommencement notification requirement furnished incumbent management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers-a preference which Congress
sought to avoid. Second, the power vested in the secretary of state and incumbent management to
request a hearing potentially afforded management a "powerful weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." Id. Third, the substantial fairness review of the offer by the secretary of state conflicted with
the congressional intention that the autonomous investor should make the decision. Thus, Justice
White concluded that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Business Takeover Act. Id. at 634-40.
47 Id. at 640.
48 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding unconstitutional an order by a state official prohibiting a company from shipping its cantaloupes outside the State unless they were appropriately packed in containers in an approved manner).
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burdens the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce. 4 9 Justice
White stated that since Illinois has no legitimate interest in protecting
nonresident shareholders, insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state
transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the
law. 50 Justice White rejected the argument that the Illinois Act regulated
the internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law. 5 1 He
stated that the internal affairs doctrine does not apply in this context
since tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a
third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the
target company.5 2 Moreover, internal affairs regulation could not justify
a statute that applied to corporations which were not incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in other states. 53
II. The Second Generation
The Supreme Court's decision in MITE5 4 confirmed the view of the
vast majority of the lower courts at that time and marked the end of the
first generation of takeover statutes. 55 In the aftermath of MITE, numerous lower courts invalidated similar first generation statutes. 5 6 More
than twenty states have passed "second generation" takeover statutes in
an attempt to find the room left open by MITE and to preserve their
ability to regulate at least some aspects of takeovers. 5 7 These statutes fall
into three groups: (1) control share acquisition; (2) fair price; and (3) registration and disclosure. MITE and its progeny have appeared to resolve some, but certainly not all, of the questions concerning the
permissible bounds of state regulation of tender offers. 58
A.

Control Share Acquisition Statutes

1. Description
Control share acquisition statutes typically require shareholders to
vote on the voting rights to be given to shares acquired in a "control
share acquisition" or require shareholders to vote in advance on whether
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

457 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id. at 645-46.
See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
See generally Comment, supra note 36.

56 See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
Take-Over Bid Act violates commerce clause); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir.
1983) (Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act violates commerce dause); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan Take-Over Offers Act violates commerce
clause); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Takeover Bid
Disclosure Act violates both commerce and supremacy clauses); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland Corporate Take-Over Laws violate commerce
and supremacy clauses); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky Take-Over
Bids Disclosure Act violates commerce clause). But see Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686
F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts Takeover Act does not violate supremacy clause).
57 See Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The Second Generation, 13 SEC. REG. LJ. 332,

340 (1985).
58 Id.
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a person can even make the acquisition. The statutes usually define a
control share acquisition as one giving a purchaser at least twenty percent of the company's voting stock.5 9 The statutes specifically apply to
purchases of companies having their principal place of business or substantial assets in the state and a small percentage of resident shareholders. Typically, the directors are given fifty days to conduct the
shareholder meeting which gives the board a greater delay period than
the Williams Act provides for tender offers. 60 Presently eight states have
control share statutes. 6 1 Control share statutes have not fared well in the
courts. 6 2 Adopting the MITE analysis, lower courts have held that such
statutes impermissibly burden interstate commerce or violate the
supremacy clause.
2.

Case Decisions

The court in Icahn v. Blunt 63 invalidated the Missouri second generation control share acquisition statute 64 as "an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of the Williams Act." 6 5 The court held that the
statute directly conflicted with the disclosure and time requirements of
the Williams Act. The statute's requirement that shareholder's approve
the control share acquisition in advance of the acquisition made it unlikely that the offeror could commence the offer within the five days the
Williams Act requires. 66 The requirement also conflicted with the Williams Act by taking the decision whether to buy or sell out of the hands of
the individual shareholder and placing it in the hands of management
and other shareholders. 6 7 The statute upset congressional efforts to protect the investor without favoring either the bidder or incumbent
59

See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-42 (1986).

See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1986);

notes 80-86 infra and accompanying text.
60 Twenty business days, and 28 days total, is the maximum amount of time the Williams Act
requires a tender offer to be kept open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
61
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 416-171 to -172 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -42-11
(Burns Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 13-A, § 901

(Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 302A.671 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10-76.5 (Supp. 1986).
62 See notes 63-102 infra and accompanying text. See also Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holdermann,
796 F.2d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1986) (The court held that the Ohio Control Share statute "frustrates
the objectives of the Williams Act and impermissibly tips the scales in favor of incumbent management by requiring a shareholder vote and by creating delay." The court also concluded that the
statute constituted "[a] direct regulation upon, as well as an indirect burden on, interstate commerce
that violated the Commerce Clause."); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (The
court held that Hawaii's control share statute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce, but did
not reach the supremacy clause issue.).
63 612 F. Supp. 1400 (D.C. Mo. 1985). The court also held the statute constituted an impermissible direct burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1414-18.
64 Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.407 (1985).
65 612 F. Supp. at 1420.
66 Id. at 1419. A person seeking a control share acquisition by means of a tender offer must first
announce an offer and submit it to the target company. Mo. REV. STAT. § 462.407(2) (1985). The
offeror could commence an offer directly to the shareholders only after receiving the approval of a
supermajority of the shareholders. Id. § 351.407(3). The Williams Act requires the offeror to commence a tender offer within five days of announcing it. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1986).
67 612 F. Supp. at 1420.
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management. 68
The district court in APL Limited Partnershipv. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,69
applied the Pike test to hold the Minnesota Control Share Acquisition
Act 70 unconstitutional under the commerce clause. A person intending
to make an acquisition of twenty percent had to file certain information
with the company, and shareholders had to approve the acquisition beforehand. The statute applied to purchases of a corporation with fifty
resident shareholders and its principal place of business or substantial
assets in the state. The court held first, that since the statute was not
restricted to Minnesota residents and since the state had no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders, there was nothing to be weighed in
the balance against the burdens the statute imposed on interstate commerce. 7 ' Second, although a state does have an interest in protecting its
business climate, this justification is based on the questionable assumption that the acquiror will engage in activity that is detrimental to Minnesota's business climate. 72 Third, the court deemed the internal affairs
doctrine inapplicable because the Act regulated shareholders, not the
corporation itself. 73 The court found that the Act placed substantial burdens74 on interstate commerce which outweighed its speculative
75
benefits.
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. 76 indicates that the Court is ready for the first time since MITE to
68 Id. The court held that the statute favored incumbent management because: (1) the statute
did not apply to a qualifying corporation if the control share acquisition is approved by a majority
of the directors in office before the first control share acquisition is made; (2) incumbent management sets the date for the shareholder vote up to 50 days after the purchaser requests the vote;
(3) notice to shareholders of the meeting to vote on the proposed purchase shall be accompanied by
a statement by management; and (4) the proposed control share acquisition cannot be made unless it
is approved by two-thirds of the outstanding shares and two-thirds of the outstanding interested
shares. By requiring two-thirds approval of all outstanding shares, all votes not cast operate as votes
against the purchaser. Id.
69 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1220-24 (D.C. Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed per stipulation Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,331 (Jan. 28, 1986). In Gelco Corp. v. Conniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987)
the court invalidated MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.011 (37)-(40), 302A.449(7), 302A.671 amended to
require that the target corporation hold the shareholder vote within twenty days after the acquiring
person statement is filed. Applying Pike, the court held that even amended, the statute imposed an
impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce. Moreover, because the Act deprived shareholders of the right to make independent decisions regarding offers to sell, it conflicts with the
Williams Act and is thus preempted. The Eighth Circuit vacated the constitutional issues raised as
moot because Conniston revoked its tender offer and expressed an intent not to proceed with a new
offer.
70 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.01 1 (37)-(40), 302A.449 (7), 302A.671 (West 1985).
71 622 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
72 Id. at 1223.
73 Id. "The acquisition of shares does not implicate the internal affairs of the target corporation.
The use of that power once the shares have been acquired may well be a proper subject of state
regulation, but this is not what the MCSAA regulates." Id.
74 Id. at 1224. The court found that the Act imposed substantial burdens on interstate commerce because: (1) it had the effect of restricting the right of nonresidents to purchase and sell stock
of Minnesota corporations; (2) if the acquiror fails to obtain shareholder approval the acquiror will
be removed from the market preventing shareholders from receiving a premium for their stock;
(3) the statute had the effect of insulating target management by making control share acquisitions
more difficult thereby reducing the incentive for incumbent management to perform well; and
(4) the statute impeded the reallocation of economic resources. Id.

75 Id. at 1225.
76 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
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examine the constitutionality of state takeover legislation. Although CTS
concerns the validity of a control share statute, the whole second generation may be in jeopardy depending on how the court rules.
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics, 7 7 a New York corporation, commenced a tender offer of CTS. Dynamics intended to increase its stock
holdings to 27.5 percent, oust current management, and elect its own
candidates at the annual shareholders meeting scheduled for April 25,
1986.78 In a defensive maneuver on March 27, the CTS directors elected
79
to be governed by the new Indiana control share acquisition statute.
The Indiana statute provides that shares acquired in a control share
acquisition 80 have voting rights only to the extent granted by shareholder
resolution. 8 1 The statute precludes the acquiror from voting its shares in
this resolution.8 2 The directors must call a shareholder meeting to consider the voting rights if an acquiror delivers an "acquiring person statement" to the issuing public corporation providing information about his
intentions and financial capacity and requests the directors to call the
special meeting.8 3 The statute precludes the board from calling the
meeting any sooner than thirty days after receipt of the acquiring person's statement and allows management to delay the meeting up to fifty
days after the request. 8 4 If the acquiror fails to file an acquiring person
statement, or if the shares are not accorded full voting rights at the meeting, the corporation may redeem the shares at their fair value determined
by management. 8 5 If the shares are accorded full voting rights and the
acquiror attains a8 6majority of voting power, the corporation may not redeem the shares.
CTS filed suit in Indiana state court seeking a declaratory judgment
77 794 F.2d at 251. Dynamics was the largest beneficial owner of common stock in CTS, owning
approximately 9.7% of the corporation's outstanding shares. Id.
78 Id.
79 IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -42-11 (West Supp. 1986). The statute was part of a series of
amendments to the Indiana Business Corporation Law signed into law on March 4, 1986 and to
become effective on August 1, 1987. The statute, however, permitted corporate boards to elect by
resolution to be governed by the statute as of April 1, 1986. Id.
80 IND. CODE § 23-1-42-2(a) defines a "control share acquisition" as the acquisition by a person
of "control shares." Shares acquired in a 90 day period are considered to have been acquired in the
same acquisition. Section 23-1-42-1 defines control shares as at least 20% ownership of the voting
power of an "issuing public corporation" which § 23-1-42-4(a) defines as a corporation having: 100
or more shareholders; its principal place of business, principal office or substantial assets in Indiana;
and either more than 10% resident Indiana shareholders, more than 10% of its shares owned by
Indiana residents, or 10,000 resident Indiana shareholders. Id. Since CTS did qualify as an issuing
corporation within the statute, the Dynamics tender offer was a control share acquisition which triggered the Act's provisions. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
81 IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9(b)(1) (1986).
82 Id. § 23-1-42-9(b)(2).
83 Id. § 23-1-42-6.
84 Id. § 23-1-42-7. The offeror will not accept the tendered shares until the stockholders meeting is held because if the offeror loses the vote on voting rights, it will end up with nonvoting shares
and will not be able to control the corporation-the main purpose of most tender offers. 794
F.2d at 261.
85 IND. CODE § 23-1-42-10(a) (1986).
86 Id. § 23-1-42-10(b). If the voters resolution approving the acquisition passes, the other shareholders have dissenters rights which enable them to receive fair value for their shares. Id. § 23-1-4211-(a) to -(c). Fair value for both sections means a value not less than the highest price paid per
share by the acquiring person in the control share acquisition. Id. § 23-1-42-11 (c).
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that the statute was valid and enforceable. Dynamics filed in federal
court seeking to enjoin CTS from attempting to enforce the statute on
87
grounds that it violated the federal commerce and supremacy clauses.
The district court determined that the Indiana statute violated the
supremacy clause because it favored target management and thus frustrated the Williams Act's policy of neutrality.8 8 The district court also
invalidated the Indiana statute under the commerce clause.8 9 The court
found that the statute burdens interstate commerce because it applies to
certain foreign corporations and it deters tender offers by limiting the
voting rights a tender offeror can purchase in a control acquisition. 90
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the Indiana statute violated the supremacy clause. 9 1
Judge Posner, writing for the court, stated that the weight of precedent
dictated that the Williams Act strikes a balance between target management and tender offeror that the states may not upset-which indicates
its preemptive intent. 92 He stated that assuming, as previous courts
have, that the Williams Act represents a congressional determination that
twenty business days (twenty-eight days total) is enough time to force a
tender offer to be kept open, the Indiana statute's delay upsets the bal87 794 F.2d at 251. A pendent state law claim in the complaint sought to enjoin a poison pill
plan on the grounds that CTS management breached its fiduciary duties under state law. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court properly enjoined the poison pill plan. The poison pill issue
is severable from the constitutional issues and is beyond the scope ofthis note. 751 F.2d at 251. For
an analysis of defensive tactics, see Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness
Burden, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 722 (1986).
88 637 F. Supp. at 399. The court found that the fifty-day option to hold the shareholder meeting, enabled incumbent management to delay the tender offer well beyond the twenty business-day
(twenty-eight days total) limit of the Williams Act. Id. at 397. The district court rejected CTS's
argument that the statute put the vote to noninterested shareholders rather than the target company's board of directors. Id. at 398. The court noted that the statute gave management the power
to control the time and execution of the special shareholders meeting. Id. The court noted that in
MITE the Supreme Court indicated that state laws which build delays into the tender offer process
themselves conflict with federal law. Id. (citing 457 U.S. at 637-38). The court also stated that the
Indiana statute does not wholly exclude interested parties from voting. Id. The district court rejected CTS's argument that the Indiana statute no more conflicts with the Williams Act than do
state laws regulating voting rights such as laws requiring supermajority votes for fundamental corporate changes which also have a deterrent effect on tender offers. Id. at 398-99. The court found that
by limiting the voting rights an acquiror can purchase, the statute in operation blocks the transaction
as effectively as a direct prohibition on control share acquisitions and is thus in direct conflict with
the Williams Act. Id. at 398.
89 Id. at 403.
90 Id. The court stated that an issuing company need only have substantial assets in Indiana and
ten thousand resident shareholders to fall within the statute. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)
(West Supp. 1986). Thus, the Act is not limited to Indiana corporations, but applies to foreign
corporations which have up to 90% of their shares owned by non-Indiana residents. The court determined that like the statute struck down in MITE, the Indiana statute applies to commerce taking
place entirely outside the state's borders. 637 F. Supp. 403. The state's interest in regulating internal corporations and protecting local shareholders could notjustify the statute's direct regulation on
the transfer of power and application to non-Indiana residents. Id. at 402. After discussing the Pike
test applied in MITE, the court concluded that "the substantial interference with interstate commerce created by the [Indiana Act] outweighs the articulated local benefits so as to create an impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 406.
91 794 F.2d at 250.
92 Id. at 262. Posner referred to National City Lines, Inc., v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 112833 (8th Cir. 1982), and Martin-Marrietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565-66 (6th Cir.
1982). See CTS, 794 F.2d at 261. He also cited Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6
(1985), and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). See CTS, 794 F.2d at 262.
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ance by allowing the target management to force an acquiror to hold a
tender offer open for fifty days. 93 Judge Posner conceded that, in contrast to the statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana statute presents less
of conflict with the neutral policy of the Williams Act. 94 However, he
stated: "The Indiana statute is a lethal dose; the fact that the Illinois
statute may have been two or three lethal doses has no practical significance. Very few tender offers could run the gauntlet which Indiana has
95
set up."

Judge Posner contended that if the Indiana statute violates the
supremacy clause it would seem "doubly academic" to evaluate it under
the commerce clause. Because of "lingering doubt" that the Williams
Act was intended to limit state takeover statutes, he stated that such an
analysis was still necessary. 9 6 He wrote that the commerce clause "is all a
matter of balancing the benefit to the state's residents against the burden
to out-of-staters. ' ' 9 7 Citing Pike, he found that the burden imposed on
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. He explained that the Act gravely impairs Dynamics, a nonresident, from transacting business with CTS's nonresident shareholders for
98
the sake of trivial or even negative benefits to Indiana residents.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the internal affairs doctrine. 9 9 The
court distinguished the Indiana statute from general regulations of internal corporate governance having an incidental effect on interstate commerce. 10 0 The court found that the Indiana statute has a direct,
intended, and substantial effect on the interstate market for securities
and corporate control. 10 ' Classifying the statute as a voting rights regulation does not insulate it from review under the commerce clause. 102
B.

FairPrice Statutes

The Williams Act governs tender offers and was not intended or
93 Id. at 263. See supra notes 26 & 60 and accompanying text.
94 Id. at 262. Posner noted that "whereas the Illinois statute both imposed precommencement
delay and allowed the secretary of state to terminate the offer, the Indiana statute imposes slightly
greater delay but subjects the offeror to the tenderer mercies of a vote of disinterested shareholders." Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 262-63.
97 Id. at 263.
98 Id. See supra notes 80 & 90 discussing the requirements for the control share statute to apply.
Posner assumed that the vast majority of CTS's and Dynamics' shareholders were nonresidents. 794
F.2d at 263. He stated that Indiana has no interest in protecting residents of Connecticut from
being stampeded to tender their shares to Dynamics. Id. (citing MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43). He
found that the only beneficiaries were the officers and directors of CTS who may even be nonresidents. He also found no evidence that a takeover by Dynamics might reduce the value of CTS or
lead to a shift of assets or employment from Indiana. See id. at 264.
99 Id. Posner stated that the state is justified in implementing laws which would make it more
difficult to acquire an Indiana corporation. Id. Posner referred to a statute requiring cumulative
voting for the board which impedes the acquiror's attempt to oust the board in one strike. Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. Posner distinguished the Minnesota statute upheld in Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch,
751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984), because there "the court was persuaded that the effect in discouraging
takeovers through delay would be slight." Id. For a discussion of CardiffAcquisitions, see infra notes
135-47 and accompanying text.
102 794 F.2d at 264.
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designed to regulate other transactions, such as the second-step merger
of a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer. l0 3 Many courts and commentators regard the stampede effect of such takeovers as highly coercive to the target shareholders and unfair to those shareholders who do
not tender their shares in the initial bid. 10 4 Since the Williams Act protects only those investors who elect to tender their shares in the frontend tender offer, states have designed fair price statutes to curb the coercive nature of two-tiered bids. 10 5 The intent of these statutes is to ensure
that shareholders who do not tender their shares in the first-step10 6tender
offer do not receive a lower price in the freeze-out transaction.
Fair price statutes shift the focus from securities regulation to corporate law and attempt to regulate the takeover process through regulation
of the internal affairs of corporations organized under the laws of the
state. 10 7 Maryland 0 8 and Pennsylvania' 0 9 have enacted typical second
generation fair price statutes. The Maryland statute requires a successful
tender offeror intending a second-step consolidation to either obtain
supermajority approval (eighty percent) from all shareholders or pay a
fair price 10 to shareholders who are forced to sell in the business combination."' The Pennsylvania statute contains similar supermajority and
fair price provisions. 1 2 Presently thirteen states have adopted fair price
statutes. 1 13 No courts have ruled on the constitutionality of these
statutes. 14
103 Note, Second Step Transactionsin Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Casefor State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REv.
343, 344 (1985). Two-tiered bids are accomplished in two separate steps. In the first step, or frontend bid, the bidder makes a tender offer sufficient to establish a majority interest so the bidder can
merge the target into the bidder. Target shareholders who fail to tender their shares in the frontend bid are thereby eliminated in the second-step "freeze-out merger." While the front-end bid is
made at a premium over the current market value of the target shares, it is generally below liquidation value, the freeze-out price is lower, and the consideration is often in the form of debt or equity
securities of the bidder rather than cash. Id.
104 Id. at 351.
105 Id. at 350-51.
106 See Note, supra note 37, at 443.
107 See Sargent, Do the Second GenerationState Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CoRP. L.
REv. 3, 5 (1985).
108 MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (Supp. 1986).
109 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
110

MD. CORP & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b) (1985).

Fair price is typically defined as the highest of (a) the highest price paid by the bidder at any
time within a certain time (e.g. two years) before the freeze-out transaction is announced;
(b) the highest price paid by the bidder in the transaction in which the bidder became an
interested shareholder, (c) the price on the date the bidder became an interested shareholder;, and (d) the price on the date the freeze-out transaction is announced.
Hanks, State Takeover Laws: The Second Generation, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 34, col. 3.
ll Id.
112 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
113 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232
to -234 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 271 A.396 to -.398 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132 to -134 (West
Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1775 to -1784 (West Supp. 1985); MISs. CODE ANN.

§§ 79-25-1 to -7 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (1985 RepI. Vol.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1986).
114 In Dart Group Corp. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. HAR 86-2187, slip op. at 200-02 (D. Md.
filedJuly 19, 1986) Dart attacked the constitutionality of the Maryland Fair Price statute in the initial

phase of its tender offer for the stock of Safeway Stores inJuly 1986, but the litigation became moot
when the parties negotiated a friendly takeover.
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Registration and Disclosure Laws

1. Description
Five states have passed second generation registration and disclosure statutes.1 15 The most recent enactment of the second generation
registration and disclosure laws is chapter fifteen of the Idaho Corporations Code. 1 16 The statute illustrates the second generation approach;
the legislature specifically revised an existing statute to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of MITE. 1' 7 The statute applies to corporations with
publicly traded securities which have: (1) at least ten percent of the securities owned by Idaho residents; 1 8 (2) assets with a value in excess of
ten million dollars located in Idaho; 1 9 (3) a monthly payroll in Idaho in
excess of twenty-five thousand dollars; 120 and (4) corporate or operational headquarters in Idaho.' 2 1 Chapter 2 2fifteen only applies to
purchases of securities from Idaho residents.'
The statute requires any person making a tender offer for more than
ten percent of any class of a stock of a company subject to the statute to
first register and file certain information with the state and target com23
pany. The disclosure requirements are similar to the Williams Act.'
The Idaho statute, however, requires additional information concerning
24
the economic impact the proposed tender offer will have on the state.'
The statute provides that the offer becomes effective when the offeror
files a registration statement with the director of the Idaho Department
of Finance.' 25 The director can summarily suspend the offer within three
days of filing if the registration statement does not contain all the required information concerning the takeover.' 2 6 The director must conduct a hearing within ten calendar days of the suspension and must
render a decision to permanently suspend an offer within three calendar
days after the hearing has been completed, 2 7 but not more than sixteen
calendar days after the suspension.' 28 The director can permanently sus115 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -11 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1514 (Supp.
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to -. 13 (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418 to -2430
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-5-101 to -114 (Supp. 1986).
116

IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1514 (Supp. 1986).

117 The Fifth Circuit invalidated Idaho's first generation takeover statute (IDAHO CODE §§ 301501 to -1513 (Supp. 1978)) in Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Tex.
1977), aft'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979). The Supreme Court reversed on grounds of improper venue. The statute was a typical
first generation model which included: (1) a sixty-day precommencement filing requirement; (2) a
hearing provision with an even longer potential period for delay; (3) a disclosure provision more
extensive than what the Williams Act required; and (4) a provision granting target management the
power to call the hearing.
118

119
120
121
122
which
123

IDAHO CODE § 30-1502-9(a) (Supp. 1986).

Id. § 30-1502-9(b).
Id. § 30-1502-9(c).
Id. § 30-1502-9(d).
Id. § 30-1502-(6). "Offeree means the beneficial owner residing in Idaho, of equity securities
an offeror offers to acquire in connection with a takeover offer." Id.
See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.

124

IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(5)(C).

125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 30-1503(1).
§ 30-1503(3).
§ 30-1503(4).
The entire process, thus must be completed within 19 calendar days which is within the 20
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pend an offer upon determining that the registration does not satisfy the
statute. 29 Unlike the "substantial fairness" provisions struck down in
other jurisdictions, the Idaho director does not have the discretion to
suspend an offer because he believes it is substantively unfair or
inequitable.
The provisions of chapter fifteen covering fraudulent and deceptive
practices, preclude a controlling stockholder from selling any stock to
the offeror at a price greater than that paid to the other stockholders
during the offer.13 0 The-statute prohibits any offer that is not substan3
tially equivalent as to both resident and nonresident stockholders.113 3'
3 2 civil liabilities,
Chapter fifteen also provides for criminal penalties,
34
and remedies that go beyond those provided by the Williams Act.'
2.

Case Decisions

The most significant judicial ruling on a second generation registration and disclosure statute is CardiffAcquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch 13 5 where the
Eight Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota Corporate
Takeover Act.' 3 6 The court narrowly construed the statute and found
that it was substantially consistent with the Williams Act, it did not impermissibly burden interstate commerce, and it protected legitimate state
37
interests.1
In its commerce clause analysis the court distinguished the Minnesota Act from the Illinois statute in MITE, finding none of the provisions
of the Illinois Act which the Supreme Court indicated were significant
burdens on interstate commerce. First, the Act did not impose a filing
period prior to the offer becoming effective.' 3 8 Second, the Act precluded the target directors as well as the offeror from disseminating information while an offer is suspended.' 3 9 Third, the Act did not cause
delay because it mandated completion of the whole hearing process
within nineteen calendar days. 140 Fourth, the Minnesota statute did not
allow the state to deny registration if it found that the offer was inequitable.' 4 ' Fifth, the Minnesota statute applies only when at least twenty percent of the target's shareholders are Minnesota residents and the target
business-day minimum offering period specified by the Williams Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a)
(1986).
129 IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4). This suspension is subject to the right of the offeror to correct
disclosure and other deficiencies identified by the director and to reinstitute the takeover. Id.
130 Id. § 30-1505(2).
131 Id. § 30-1506(1).
132 Id. § 30-1510.
133 Id. § 30-1511.
134 Id. § 30-1510(4). An offeror who acquires shares in violation of the statute is denied shareholder rights for one year after acquisition of the stock. Id.
135 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
136 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to .13 (West Supp. 1984).
137 751 F.2d at 909.
138 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.05(4).

139 751 F.2d at 910.
140

Id. The SEC requires a bidder to hold an offer open for a minimum of twenty business days.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1986).
141 751 F.2d at 914. The court stated that the commissioner was authorized to review the disclosure so long as it was limited to sufficiency.
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has substantial assets in the state, and the suspension only applies to
Minnesota residents. 14 2 The court noted that in providing for simultaneous enforcement of federal disclosure requirements the statute benefited
local investors without imposing a significant or excessive burden on offerors. 14 3 The court also stated that the statute's additional disclosure
requirements concerning the economic impact that the tender offer
would have on the state aided the shareholders in deciding whether to
44
sell their stock.1
While the court found certain provisions of the statute unconstitutional, 14 5 the statute itself passed muster under the supremacy clause.
The court stated that MITE did not control the preemption issue since
the majority there only agreed on the commerce clause challenge.146
The court concluded that the Williams Act did not preempt the Minnesota statute because its provisions were not "incompatible" with the Wil14 7
liams Act.
The Sixth Circuit in L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 148 held that the disclosure portion of Michigan's takeover statute, at least insofar as it regulates tender offers for unregistered securities, did not violate the
commerce clause.' 4 9 The statute required a five-percent offeror to file a
registration statement with virtually identical disclosure provisions as the
Williams Act.' 50 The target was not a 34 Act company and thus the Williams Act did not apply to the offeror.' 5 ' The court, applying the Pike
balancing test, determined that the state's legitimate interest in protecting resident shareholders outweighed the statute's extraterritorial effect.' 52 The Michigan disclosure requirements provided substantial
benefits to resident shareholders because the Williams Act's disclosure
142 Id. Cardiff contended that the Minnesota Act burdened interstate commerce because it imposed disclosure requirements beyond those of the Williams Act, it increased the existence, enforcement and cost of launching the offer, and a suspension in Minnesota may discredit the tender offer
nationwide. Cardiff also argued that alleged protections to local investors are illusory because most
of the disclosures required by the Minnesota Act are already required by the Williams Act and the
additional disclosures serve no valid purpose. Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 912.
145 Id. at 913. The court held that two provisions of the statute that authorized the commissioner
to prescribe additional disclosure requirements were "unconstitutionally vague and open ended."
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.03(2), (6). The court noted that the provisions may require the disclosure of irrelevant or confusing data and may require judgmental data the commissioner has no authority to require. 751 F.2d at 914.
146 Id. at 913. The court found that the statute sought to protect unique and legitimate interests
of Minnesota shareholders and the commissioner must only decide if sufficient information has been
disclosed as required. Id. at 914.
147 Id. at 913.
148 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985). The court struck down provisions of the Michigan Take-Over
Offers Act as preempted by the Williams Act, but upheld the provisions under the commerce clause.
See MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451.901 to -.917 (West Supp. 1986).
149 772 F.2d at 201. With respect to regulations of transactions involving registered securities
the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act was declared unconstitutional in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
150 Id. at 204.
151 Id. The court also noted that only 50% of the target's shareholders were Michigan residents.
Id. at 203.
152 Id. at 205.
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requirements did not apply.'15
III.

Constitutional Analysis of State Takeover Statutes

A. Clarifying the Role of States in Takeover Regulation
The United States Supreme Court by granting certiorari in CTS may
have recognized that lower courts need guidance in deciding the constitutionality of state tender offer regulation. The CardiffAcquisitions decision, which the Seventh Circuit distinguished in CTS, suggests that states
may continue to regulate the tender offer process. The controversy in
the federal courts on the validity of the second generation statutes requires the Supreme Court to clarify the roles of federal and state governments in regulating corporate acquisitions. In addition to ruling on the
control share acquisition statute at issue in CTS, the Supreme Court
should offer guidance on the continuing validity of fair price and modified disclosure statutes.
B.

Commerce Clause Analysis

The Supreme Court, in its CTS ruling, should follow MITE and apply the Pike test to determine if a state's takeover statute violates the commerce clause. The Pike analysis provides that "[d]irect regulation of
interstate commerce by the states is prohibited."' 54 But a state statute
which incidentally regulates interstate commerce will be upheld "unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits."' 155- InAPL Limited Partnershipv. Van Dusen Air,
Inc. ,156 the court properly applied the Pike test to rule that the substantial
burdens which the Minnesota statute imposed on interstate commerce
outweighed the local benefits of shareholder protection and regulation of
internal affairs.' 5 7 The court held that since states have no interest in
protecting nonresidents and the statute burdened interstate commerce,
there were no local benefits arising from the statute to weigh in the balance.' 58 Similarly in CTS, the Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana statute, by depriving the acquiror of the property interest (voting rights) he
purchased in the stock, imposed a burden on interstate commerce which
was "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 59
C. Supremacy ClauseAnalysis
The Supreme Court should adopt the CTS supremacy clause analysis. The CTS decision is in accord with the majority of the courts since
MITE which have held that state laws which unfairly advantage incumbent management in the context of a battle for corporate control conflict
with the Williams Act and are thus invalid.
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 206.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Id.
622 F. Supp. 1216. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1220-25.
Id. at 1223.
794 F.2d at 263. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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Judge Posner referred to the supremacy clause analysis applied in
National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp.,160 in which the Eight Circuit held
that the Williams Act preempted Missouri's first generation takeover statute. 16 1 The National City Lines court stated that in determining whether a
state law is preempted the first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to
its power to regulate commerce, 62 has expressly or implicitly prohibited
state regulation of the particular case. 16 3 The court noted that Congress
has not chosen to expressly or implicitly bar states from regulating
tender offers.' 64 But the court stated that congressional enactments
which do not expressly exclude state legislation in the field nevertheless
override state laws with which they conflict. 16 5 Thus, the court in National City Lines concluded that the issue then is "whether under the circumstances of this particular case, the [state's takeover act] stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in passing the Williams Act."' 66 As Posner stated
in CTS, most courts agree that the Williams Act has some preemptive
intent in that it "strikes a balance between target management and the
tender offeror which may not be upset by state regulation."' 16 7 The CTS
decision reinforces the view that the Williams Act does not preempt all
state regulation of tender offers. Judge Posner expressed his "lingering
doubt" whether the Williams Act was intended to preempt all state takeover statutes. 168 Posner stated:
[O]f course it is a big leap from saying that the Williams Act does not
itself exhibit much hostility to tender offers to saying that it implicitly
forbids states to adopt more hostile regulations, but this leap was
Court in MITE and by every court to consider
taken by the Supreme
169
the question since.
In MITE 170 only three justices found that the provisions of the Illinois Business Takeover statute were preempted. Justice Stevens, refus160 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690
F.2d 558, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1982).
161 Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 409.500 to -.565 (1979).
162 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
163 687 F.2d at 1128. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
164 687 F.2d 1122 (citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979)).
165 687 F.2d at 1128-29 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 141). See U.S. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 8.
166 687 F.2d at 1129. See also Michigan Canners & Freezers Assoc. Inc., v. Agricultural Marketing
and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) ("Because the Michigan Act authorizes producer associations to engage in conduct that the federal act forbids it stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)
("Preemption should be judged on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal
and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate
the objectives of the federal law."); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 221 (1983) ("It is well established that a state law is preempted if it
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.").
167 794 F.2d at 261.
168 Id. at 263.
169 Id. at 262.
170 457 U.S. 624.
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ing to join the preemption analysis, stated that he was not persuaded that
Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is
tantamount to a federal prohibition against state tender offer legislation. 17 1 Similarly, Justice Powell did not join the preemption analysis,
stating that the Court's commerce clause reasoning leaves some room for
state regulation 17 2 and that states have legitimate interests in regulating
tender offers. 173 MITE thus cannot stand for a broad preemption principle under which courts must invalidate any state regulation of tender
offers.
IV.

A Limited Third Generation
A.

Control Share Statutes

The Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit's holding in
CTS that control share acquisition statutes are unconstitutional as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce or as preempted by the Williams Act. The CTS holding is consistent with the case law emanating
from the courts on control share acquisition statutes. A state takeover
statute that limits the voting rights a person can acquire or regulates
stock transactions between nonresident shareholders and a nonresident
purchaser impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit, applying Pike, correctly held that because a state has no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders and corporations, the burdens
which such a statute imposes on interstate commerce outweigh any purported state interests in protecting shareholders, or in regulating the internal affairs of corporations.' 74 Statutes that delay the tender offer
process beyond the time limits specified by the Williams Act deter tender
offers and tip the scales in favor of target management. These statutes
are an obstacle to the Williams Act's policy of neutrality between bidders
and incumbent management.
B.

FairPrice Statutes

Under the Pike test, courts should find that fair price statutes violate
the commerce clause. The burdens which fair price statutes impose on
interstate commerce are excessive in relation to their purported local
benefits.' 75 Fair price statutes excessively burden interstate commerce
by discouraging hostile interstate takeovers both in purpose and effect.' 76 Because the required supermajority votes are so difficult to ob171 Id. at 655.
172 Id. at 646-47.
173 Id. at 646. Justice Powell stated when corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city
and state, the locality suffers significantly; financial and leadership contributions to cultural, community, charitable, and educational life tend to diminish. Id.
174 794 F.2d at 263.
175 397 U.S. at 142.
176 See Sargent, supra note 107, at 32. Other benefits at least partially derived from fair price
statutes are that they: (1) allow nontendering shareholders an opportunity to vote on changes in
corporate control; (2) reduce hostile takeovers thereby allowing managers to engage in long range
planning; and (3) allow management a freer hand to consider defensive tactics which allows them to
bargain on behalf of shareholders. Id.
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tain and fair price provisions significantly increase the cost of two-step
takeovers, the statutes not only hinder consolidation of ownership in the
freeze-out transaction, but also inevitably discourage takeovers themselves. 1 77 In effect, fair price statutes amount to a direct prohibition on a
bidder seeking one hundred percent ownership, because a bidder will
not normally initiate a tender offer that is excessively costly or practically
impossible to consummate the freeze-out merger. 178 The fact that fair
price statutes impact on takeovers results from the second-step merger
regulation rather than direct regulation of tender offers is constitutionally insignificant.' 79 Fair price statutes have an effect on interstate com180
merce as great as the first generation statutes invalidated by MITE,
and greater than the control share acquisition statutes struck down in
CTS and other cases.
The local benefits do not outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce. The only nexus to the state most fair price statutes require is that
the target corporation be incorporated in that state.1 8 ' The typical fair
price statute applies to all shareholders, both resident and nonresident.' 82 Under the Pike analysis a state has no interest in protecting nonresidents. Fair price statutes appear to protect shareholders from the
coercive nature of two-tiered takeovers, but it does not outweigh the deterrent effect on takeovers. While an attempt to deter hostile takeovers
reflects a concern for local jobs and not target management per se, such
parochialism remains exactly what the commerce clause was designed to
83
prevent.
Courts should apply the National City Lines preemption test adopted
in CTS to find that fair price statutes are "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in
passing the Williams Act." 1 84 While fair price statutes regulate only the
second-step transaction and do not actually prevent compliance with any
procedural or disclosure requirements or alter time limits of the Williams
Act,' 85 the deterrent effect of fair price statutes conflicts with the Williams Act's policy of neutrality.' 8 6 Additionally, under both the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes the target board of directors may
87
determine the applicability of the statute to individual transactions.
The apparent purpose of these provisions is to permit negotiated transactions without subjecting them to the supermajority vote or fair price
provisions. 188 Nothing in the Williams Act supports a preference for negotiated takeovers at the expense of contested takeovers. This intention
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Hanks, supra note 110. See also Note, supra note 103, at 352; Note, supra note 37, at 456.
Hanks, supra note 110, at 34, col. 4.
Id. at 35, col. 1.
Sargent, supra note 107, at 13.
Hanks, supra note 110, at 34, col. 4.
Id. at 35, col. 1.
Sargent, supra note 107, at 31.
687 F.2d at 1129.
See Note, supra note 103, at 351.
See Hanks, supra note 110, at 34, col. 4.
Sargent, supra note 107, at 12.
See Hanks, supra note 110, at 34, col. 4.
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is an obstacle to the congressional policy that contested takeovers should
18 9
neither be encouraged nor discouraged.
C. Registration and Disclosure Statutes
Unlike control share acquisition and fair price statutes, courts should
find state registration and disclosure laws constitutional. Judge Posner in
CTS recognized that states still have a role to play in regulating corporate
takeovers when he distinguished Cardiff Acquisitions.190 Presently five
states have adopted corporate takeover legislation based on the Minnesota statute upheld in Cardiff Acquisitions.19 1 States must eliminate the
precommencement notification and substantive review provisions found
in the first generation statutes held unconstitutional. 1 92 State agencies
must conduct hearings in a timely fashion and restrict them to considera193
tion of full disclosure.
The Idaho statute' 94 does not violate the commerce clause because
it avoids the burden on interstate commerce which concerned Justice
White in MITE and the federal courts that have considered the validity of
takeover statutes. 195 By limiting the application of chapter fifteen to
Idaho residents, the Idaho legislature has minimized the constitutional
problems caused by the extraterritorial effects of other state takeover
statutes. The Idaho statute will indirectly burden interstate commerce
when the target company has substantial numbers of Idaho shareholders. 196 However, in contrast to control share acquisition and fair price
statutes which in operation amount to a direct prohibition on interstate
tender offers, the extraterritorial effect of second generation disclosure
statutes is minimal.
The CardiffAcquisitions court held that whatever effect dual registration would have on interstate transactions will be outweighed by the additional protection conferred on resident shareholders by simultaneous
enforcement of state and federal disclosure requirements. 9 7 In L.P. Acquisition, the court recognized that states have a strong interest in regulating tender offers where federal security laws do not apply. 198 States
should have a similar interest in concurrently regulating tender offers to
which federal laws apply where the federal agency empowered to enforce
189

Id.

190

794 F.2d at 264 (citing Cardiff v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984)).

191

See supra note 115.

192 See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1978), rev'd sub. nora., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). But see Agency
Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1038 (Ist Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts Statute not
preempted).
193 See Cane & Taussig, Hawaii's 1985 Corporate Take-over Legislation: Is It Constitutional?, 8 HAw. L.
REv. 391, 414 (1985).
194 IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1514 (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying

text.
195 See generally MITE, 457 U.S. 624; supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
196 In CardiffAcquisitions, Cardiff argued that the similar Minnesota statute burdened interstate
commerce because of the cost and effort of complying with both state and federal disclosure requirements. 751 F.2d at 911.
197 Id. at 912.
198 772 F.2d 201. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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them does not have sufficient resources to achieve the task. State disclosure statutes like Idaho's are consistent with L.P. Acquisition. A state may
establish a hearing scheme to evaluate the adequacy of an offeror's disclosures as long as the scheme does not conflict with federal laws and
regulations. 199 Because the Idaho Corporate Takeover statute stays
within the confines of the Williams Act disclosure requirements, L.P. Acquisition properly validates the second generation approach of concurrent
regulation. Courts should apply the National City Lines test to determine
whether the Williams Act preempts second generation registration and
disclosure statutes such as Idaho's. The Idaho statute does not stand as
"an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress in passing the Williams Act."
First generation statutes which mandated far more information than
the Williams Act requires or which delayed the tender offer process obstructed congressional intent. Target management could use such provisions as effective weapons to fight off a bidder.20 0 The more detailed the
state's regulations and the more disclosure required, the greater the opportunity target management has to delay the offer and structure a defense. 20 1 Such excessive regulations cut against the federal policy of
neutrality and "tip the scales" in favor of management.2 0 2 However,
since second generation disclosure laws such as Idaho's impose no extra
delay and closely parallel Williams Act requirements, courts should not
hold that the statutes frustrate congressional intent. The Idaho Director
of Finance can require hearings but the statute dictates that the agency
must conduct them in a timely fashion and restrict its evaluation to full
disclosure. Since the disclosure mandated is largely the same as that required by the Williams Act, the statute's requirements do not have a significant impact on the battle between the offeror and target company.
Moreover, since Idaho has eliminated procedures which delay commencement of the offer, the statute does not place management in a protected or preferred position, and is thus consistent with the Williams
Act's policy of neutrality.
D.

The Need for Dual Regulation

Some commentators argue that since the Williams Act currently provides shareholders with adequate protection in tender offers, any state
regulation that did not violate the supremacy clause would merely be redundant.2 0 3 Another view is that because shareholders hold stock primarily for investment purposes, any additional state disclosure
requirements may accomplish more harm than good by confusing share199 772 F.2d at 209. "We do not hold that a state might never establish a hearing scheme to
inquire into the adequacy of an offeror's disclosures. However, whatever scheme a state devises
must operate within the confines of congressional intent expressed through the federal securities
laws and regulations." Id.
200 See Note, supra note 10, at 731.
201 See supra note 32.
202 See supra note 14.
203 See Note, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post MITE: The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REV. 731, 774 (1986). See generally Note, supra note 103.
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holders. 204 Although disclosure statutes such as Idaho's add little substantively to the protections already provided by federal law, the statutes
add an enforcement dimension that may not be available at the federal
level. The overburdened SEC has stated that because of budgetary restraints its resources are inadequate to review the myriad of Williams Act
disclosure filings and to investigate potential violations. 205 The SEC has
had to retreat from many of its routine functions in the area of takeovers
and acquisitions. 20 6 As a result the SEC has had to rely increasingly on
state agencies to enforce securities regulations in most takeover disputes. 20 7 Thus, the Idaho Department of Finance, by filling the gap
where the SEC has retreated in enforcement of disclosure laws, will play
a significant role in effectuating the investor protection policies of the
Williams Act. 20 8 In CardiffAcquisitions the court noted that this is particu-

larly significant considering that the SEC lacks the resources to police the
20 9
thousands of schedule 13(d) reports and amendments fied each year.
The court added: "The state on the other hand apparently has the resources to carefully examine the reports to ensure that they do in fact
disclose the information required by the' state statute and
regulations.

' 2 10

State regulatory agencies such as the Idaho Department of Finance
will generally exhibit more interest in those state takeover offers that impact on the state economy. State security regulation agencies are closer
to the facts and generally proceed more efficiently than the SEC with the
enforcement of takeover regulations in their states. 2 11 In Idaho, and in
other states drafting new takeover statutes based on the CardiffAcquisitions
model, this system of dual regulation, along with added penalty provisions, should strengthen enforcement efforts and help ensure full disclosure for resident shareholders without infringing on congressional
intent.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision in
CTS and hold that state control share acquisition statutes are unconstitutional under both the commerce and supremacy clauses. Because of the
confusion in the federal courts regarding the proper role of the states in
204 See Comment, supra note 6, at 1126.
205 See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int'l Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984). In an amicus
brief, the SEC noted that it does not have the resources to police the truthfulness of the myriad of
schedule 13(d) filings made each year.
206 See Cane & Taussig, supra note 193, at 416 (quoting Ingersoll, InundatedAgency: Busy SEC Must
Let Many Cases, Filings, Go Uninvestigated, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 1.).
207 Id.

208 Former SEC Chairman Cohen emphasized this orientation in his testimony before the Senate:
"The principal point is that we are not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are
concerned with the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare... the investor
is lost somewhere in the shuffle, this is our concern and our only concern." Hearingson S.510 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967)
(quoted in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,31 (1977)).
209 751 F.2d at 912.
210

lId

211 Cane & Taussing, supra note 193, at 416.
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the regulation of corporate takeovers, the Court should take the opportunity to offer guidance on fair price and disclosure statutes.
Courts should invalidate fair price statutes but uphold registration
and disclosure laws such as Idaho's. Since registration and disclosure
statutes will only pass muster if they do not substantially deviate from the
requirements of the Williams Act, the overall effect of the Idaho approach will be a substantial decrease in independent state regulation of
takeovers.
While limited second generation disclosure statutes add little to substantive protections already provided by the Williams Act, they will provide for concurrent regulation of tender offers at the state and federal
levels and further the congressional intent of investor protection. Dual
enforcement will enable the SEC to effectively discharge its statutory responsibilities at a time when the current takeover frenzy is severely testing the federal agency's regulatory authority.
Howard F.Mulligan
Addendum
On April 21, 1987 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision in CTS and upheld Indiana'scontrol share acquisitionstatute (6-3).
The Court deviatedfrom the decisions emanatingfrom the circuits over the pastfour
years in holdingthat the statute does not impermissibly interfere with interstatecorporate transactionsnor conflict with FederalSecurities Law. Justice Powell writingfor
the majority stated that the statute was "within the state's authority to regulate domestic corporations" and has a "limited" effect on interstate commerce. The Court
held that the statute does not prevent or unduly delay tender offers, but "only provides regulatory procedures designed for the protection of the corporation's
shareholders."
In dissent, Justice White who was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
wrote that the Indiana statute will "predictablyforeclose completely some tender offers" and amounts to the kind ofstate "economic protectionism" burdening interstate
commerce that the Constitution was designed to prevent. Moreover, Justice White
stated that the statute "undermines the policy of the Williams Act by effectively
preventing minority shareholdersfrom acting in their own best interests by selling
their stock."
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in CTS, a number of states probably will draft control share statutes based on the Indiana model. Because the CTS
decision is limited to the control share statutes, the controversy concerning the states'
role in takeover regulation is not resolved. Courts should apply the analysis suggested in this note when rulingon second generationfairpriceand disclosurestatutes.

